Today I have another excerpt from a philosophy paper I wrote a while back. This paper was a bit of an overview of epistemology (the philosophy of knowledge) and is very basic. The excerpt I want to share is an overview and does not tell the whole tale of the regress problem but gives an overview. Lastly, I would like to share that my epistemic belief falls somewhere within Radical Skepticism and External World Skepticism. While I believe these to be correct the do not provide a very happy existence thus I rely on Laurence BonJour’s particular twist on Coherentism. All that said I hope you enjoy this taste of epistemology and if any of it peaks your intrigue do some research and come to your own conclusions.
The philosophical study of knowledge has a clear way for a belief to be justified: by being supported by other beliefs. The way this is supposed to be achieved is by the Transmission Principal for Justification, which has four steps to achieve justification. First, I am justified in believing that A and B are true. Second, A and B provide significant epistemic support for C. Third, I am justified in believing that the second step is true. Lastly, I competently infer C from A and B. And with those four steps one is justified in believing C. This principle for justification appears to solve the question of how a belief can be justified, but it runs into a serious problem. The question then must be raised – what justifies my belief in A and B from the Transmission Principal? The problem that arises is the need to justify the justification. Say D justifies the belief in A and B. What would justify D? This ends up causing a chain of questions, which asks what justifies the previous justification. If one of the justifications in the chain turns out to be unjustified, then the whole structure of beliefs falls. An example would be if L turns out to be unjustified and L justifies K and J justifies K and I justify J and so on, all the beliefs in the chain no longer have justification. This is what is known in Epistemology as regress. Regress is the aforementioned chain of justified beliefs and it only has four exhaustible options for how the chain will progress. First option: the chain ends when a justified true belief is found that does not need justification from other beliefs. Second option: it ends in an unjustified belief that would collapse the chain. Third option: the chain circles back on itself to see A justifying A. The fourth option is that the chain goes on indefinitely. It becomes clear that the third and fourth options are ones to avoid in the regress argument. Skepticism is the view that I take towards the regress argument, as well as epistemological systems of justification. Skepticism is a view that doubts certain knowledge as being false. The impossibility to understand knowledge is the view that skeptics take in epistemological debates. Empirical skepticism has a view on the regress argument and any specific empirical belief. The process goes for any empirical belief A: one, if A is to be justified, then it should be supported by reasons that justify it. Two: the resulting chain of reasons is either never-ending, limited, or circular in nature. Three: no individual with finite cognitive abilities can access internally or externally, an infinite chain of reasons. Four: no circular chain of reasons can induce justification. Five: so the chain cannot be circular or infinite in its nature. Six: if the chain happens to be finite, then it will end with either a justified or unjustified belief. Seven: any belief at the end of a chain of justification must not be justified by any other beliefs, (so by premise one it is unjustified). Eight: Unjustified beliefs cannot provide justification to other beliefs. So, therefore, A is unjustified. This leads to a problem for any empirical belief and induces radical skepticism about beliefs. Philosophers have found ways of dealing with the regress argument that does not entail skepticism. These theories of justification are Foundationalism and Coherentism. These theories aim to deal with the regress argument while avoiding skepticism, and each has merits along with flaws.
EnhancingSonder 